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Abstract
Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) is a non-punitive method for
reducing crime through the design of the built environment. The relevance of CPTED
strategies however is less clear in the context of computing environments. Building upon
prior research indicating that computing environments may change computer users’
behaviors, this study tests the effectiveness of CPTED based approaches in mitigating
system trespassing events. Findings from this randomized controlled field trial
demonstrate that specific CPTED strategies can mitigate hacking events by: reducing the
number of concurrent activities on the target computer, attenuating the number of
commands typed in the attacked computer, and decreasing the likelihood of hackers
returning to a previously hacked environment. Our findings suggest some novel and
readily implemented strategies for reducing cybercrime.
Key Words: CPTED, Cybercrime, Hacking, Crime Prevention, Randomized Experiment
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INTRODUCTION
For centuries, societies around the globe have developed design features to make
crime harder to commit, limit criminal opportunities, and prevent crime (Kitchen and
Schneider, 2007). It is now routine to design and build the physical environment to
provide safer spaces for human interaction (Cozens and Love, 2015), as criminologists,
planners, and architects create areas that are conducive to ‘non-problematic’ activity
while simultaneously discouraging crime and disorderly behaviour under the banner of
crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) (Sutton, Cherney, and White,
2008:60). Drawing upon more than half a century of insights (see Jacobs, 1961), there is
now “little doubt” that CPTED can influence offender decision-making (Armitage, Joyce,
and Monchuk, 2018: 123). Numerous governments and the United Nations (2007) have
shared this position, and have implemented CPTED techniques across North America,
the Middle East, Europe, and Australasia (Ekblom et al., 2013; Cozens and Love 2015).
The relevance of CPTED strategies are less clear in the context of hacked
computing environments however. Hacking or cracking is commonly defined as the
unauthorized access of a computer system with criminal intention (Grabosky, 2016).
Acknowledging the potential risks and damages these crimes pose to governmental,
private, and business organizations, many official efforts have been devoted to the
development of technical tools like anti-malware software, vulnerability scanners,
firewalls, and Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (Bace and Mell, 2001). Sharing
similarities with terrestrial impediments to crime, these interventions aim to identify and
alert for vulnerabilities and prevent the development of cyber-attacks (Waldrop, 2016).
Although these tools are designed to identify vulnerabilities and prevent their exploitation

by malicious actors, none of these tools allow complete prevention and rapid detection of
these incidents as well as effective mitigation of the consequence of an attack. To this
point, few prior studies have explored the way different configuration of an attacked
computing environment influence the behaviours of illegitimate users of the system (see
Testa et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2015; Maimon et al., 2014), with no prior research
having investigated the effectiveness of CPTED approaches in preventing and mitigating
the development of hacking events.
Utilizing recent advances in cybercrime research, we designed the present study
to extend the experimental research on CPTED and to observe whether its benefits extend
to online environments. Cyberspace is an ideal place to examine criminological theories
that are unable to be tested in the terrestrial world as cybercrime seems to follow similar
offending patterns which have been observed in offline environments (Leukfeldt and Yar,
2016; McGuire, 2007; Yar, 2005). As computer environments are able to be identically
duplicated and are able to be manipulated for remote hackers (Farinholt et al 2017;
Spitzner, 2003), this study leverages these previous insights to provide the cleanest
conceptual test of CPTED that has been completed and tests four potential methods for
reducing cybercrime. By randomly assigning offenders to identical environments and
observing their behaviour within these environments over a period of 30 days, this study
examines whether interventions modelled after the CPTED concepts of territoriality,
surveillance, access control, and place management (Sohn, 2016; NSW Department of
Urban Affairs and Planning, 2001) were able to reduce hacking behaviours.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
CPTED rests upon the claim that “the proper design and effective use of the built
environment can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an
improvement in quality of life” (Crowe, 2000: 46). Beginning with the seminal works of
Jacobs (1961), Jeffery (1977), and Newman (1972), this multidisciplinary approach to
crime prevention draws upon insights from criminology, environmental psychology,
planning, and architecture to achieve these goals (Cozens, 2008). This approach to crime
prevention hypothesizes that through changing a potential offender’s perception of a
place crime can be reduced (Brantingham, Brantingham, and Wong, 1991; Cozens,
Saville, and Hiller, 2005). Recognizing that certain environmental designs unintentionally
lead to the commission of crime and social decay (Giles-Conti et al., 2016; Haider and
Iamtrakul, 2018; Gotham and Kennedy, 2019), the core of this approach to crime
prevention is identifying what does work instead of what ought to work (Jacobs, 1961;
Cherney and Sutton, 2007).
Empirically identifying what does work has however been “as difficult as
untangling a spider’s web” for both practical and theoretical reasons (Kitchen and
Schneider, 2002: 158). CPTED is primarily rooted in rational choice theories of crime
(Cozens, 2008). Beyond this underlying assumption, greater agreement in core concepts
has proven more difficult. Driven in part by continued disciplinary disputes between
planners, urban designers, police, and criminologists (Zahm, 2005), numerous typologies
have emerged that identify anywhere from four to 21 principles of CPTED across one to

three strata. Moffat (1983) has suggested that there are six core CPTED domains,1
whereas those such as Cozens (2014) have provided multi-level integrated models
comprised of 21 principles across three strata.2 While more theoretically plausible and
encompassing, more complex CPTED theories have been attributed in part as leading to
inconsistent applications and transferability issues across contexts (Gibson and Johnson,
2016; Ekblom, 2011). In practice, Sohn (2016) argues that the four key principles of
CPTED that have emerged are: 1) territoriality, 2) surveillance, 3) place management and
4) access control. This more parsimonious approach has been embraced legislatively and
employed routinely in numerous jurisdictions, including the Australian state of New
South Wales since 2001 (Clancey, Fisher, and Yeung, 2016; NSW Department of Urban
Affairs and Planning, 2001), and provides an ideal place to begin developing the
randomized experimental literature on CPTED.
Despite enjoying widespread political support as a theoretically non-punitive
crime prevention option (Fisher and Piracha 2012), CPTED’s effectiveness at preventing
crime has been questioned. While extensive, the current evidence base has been unable to
isolate the impacts of design interventions on crime from idiosyncratic environmental
factors (Cozens and Love, 2015; Taylor, 2002). CPTED has also proven to be difficult to
implement effectively in practice. Driven by the vague definitions within the literature
and divergence between its intended use and actual implementation, Ekblom (2011)
presents that CPTED strategies have led to wasted time, resources, and effort (see also

1

According to Moffat (1983) the six core 1st Generation CPTED domains are: territoriality, surveillance,
target hardening, access control, image maintenance, and activity program support.
2
The three strata are: 1st generation CPTED, 2nd Generation CPTED, and Surrounding
Environment/Routine Activities. For a full description see Cozens (2014).

Minnery and Lim 2005; Parnaby 2006). CPTED thus requires careful and long-term
coordination between numerous stakeholder groups to mitigate its risks to the public
regardless of its potential crime prevention benefits (Clancey, Fisher, and Rutherford
2014). Spurred on by these observations and Zahm’s (2005: 291) dictum that “without
evaluation, it will never be clear when, where, and why such programs have been
effective,” recent studies have collected innovative data to address the empirical gap in
the CPTED literature. These studies have produced supporting evidence that CPTED can
reduce robberies and burglaries (Armitage, Joyce, and Monchuk, 2018; Casteel and PeekAsa 2000; Peeters and Berken 2017), residential crime (Sohn 2016), and crime within
schools (Vagi et al. 2018). While these studies represent a small fraction of the
implementations of these principles globally, raising concerns regarding how indicative
these experiences are, they do demonstrate that when implemented and maintained well
CPTED initiatives can reduce crime across a wide range of locations.
Compounding previous criticisms, the empirical literature underpinning our
understanding of the crime prevention benefits of CPTED is still underdeveloped. In
examining whether one is able to link causally CPTED to crime reductions, Taylor
(2002) neatly presents three major issues that have limited the inferences from previous
studies and need to be overcome. Firstly, the majority of the empirical evidence testing
CPTED has been cross-sectional due to the cost intensive nature of implementing
CPTED interventions and measuring crime over time (Taylor, 2002). As crime is neither
stable over time nor equal across places, such cross-sectional studies are unable to assess
the temporal ordering of any relationships or any relative impacts on crime (Bowen and
Wiersma, 1999). Connected to this point, Taylor (2002) also laments that the lack of

resources devoted to studying these impacts has rendered it difficult to gain the required
statistical power to allow researchers to detect any impacts stemming from the
implementation of any CPTED (see also Armitage and Monchuk, 2011). Finally, and
most difficult to overcome, Taylor (2002: 416) presents that in gaining the statistical
power capable of detecting any impacts, heterogeneity in treatment and “selection
problems make it exceedingly difficult to separate qualities of locale from qualities of
those drawn to the locale.” Unlike the previous two issues, the inability to distinguish the
effects of treatment from idiosyncratic factors in the terrestrial environment persist
regardless of the sample size and the length of the observation period. Paradoxically, the
larger the sample size and observation period the less likely any impacts will be able to
be observed (Weisburd, Petrosino, and Mason, 1993; Sherman, 2007). This challenge
thus cannot be solved through increased research resources, and instead alternative
research methods are required to better identify the crime prevention benefits of CPTED.
To date, only two existing studies can be classified as level 3 studies (Crow and
Bull 1975; Eck and Wartell 1996; see Cozens and Love, 2015) according to the Maryland
Scale (Farrington et al. 2002). A level 3 study according to the Maryland scale includes a
study design where a comparison is made between two or more comparable units of
analysis, one with and one without the program or intervention. Drawing upon the
assertions of Cook and Campbell (1979), Farrington et al. (2002: 17) state that this should
be regarded “as the minimum design that is adequate for drawing conclusions about what
works.” Although studies that meet this standard are unable to account for selection
effects, level 3 studies are able to account for maturation and trend influences (Farrington
et al., 2002). Since the observations of Cozens and Love (2015) there have been some

key developments where linear regression methods and structural equation modelling
have been used to enhance previous cross-sectional, case study, and before-and-after
differences (see Armitage, Joyce, and Monchuk, 2018; Casteel and Peek-Asa 2000;
Peeters and Berken 2017; Sohn 2016; Vagi et al. 2018). These methods have been better
able to account for previously unmeasured contextual and individual factors, potentially
yielding a Maryland Scale rating of 4 whereby they deal with selection and extraneous
factors more adequately. Given the findings across these studies that support CPTED’s
crime reduction claims, there is growing evidence that CPTED is able to influence
offender decisions (Armitage, Joyce, and Monchuk, 2018). However, the need to produce
stronger evidence investigating its crime prevention tag remains.
On the Relevance of CPTED in the Design of Secure Cyber Environments
Cyber environments are important domains within which online criminal activity
takes place. Originally designed for supporting efficient information exchange between
remote individuals and organizations in cyberspace, these online environments now
facilitate ground for the rise in the volume of cybercrime incidents around the world
(Broadhurst, 2006), costing in excess of $600 billion globally in 2017 (Lewis, 2018).
Indeed, the consequences of recent data breaches to several major financial,
communication, and insurance companies computing environments have been broad and
consequential for nations and thousands of people (Holt and Bossler, 2014). Many
traditional criminal justice policies for reducing cybercrime have thus far proven
ineffective, as sanction threats are unlikely on their own to influence offending behaviour
(Mayer 2015; Kigerl 2016). Hackers are generally aware that it is unlikely that they will
be identified due to their use of proxies (Geers, 2012), and even if they are identified,

many nations will not extradite their own citizens (Brenner, 2009). Coupled together,
these factors display the futility of traditional criminal justice responses for incapacitating
or deterring these offenders (Holt, 2017).
Still, the virtual environment shares many similarities with the terrestrial world,
especially with regard to criminality. Numerous studies have found that virtual and
terrestrial criminality share numerous practical and theoretical components (Donner et al.,
2014; Yar, 2005), supporting Grabosky’s (2001: 243) claim that “virtual criminality is
basically the same as the terrestrial crime with which we are familiar.” Online
environments also face many criminal challenges that are similar to public spaces.
Businesses and public spaces in both realms seek to attract legitimate and law-abiding
users while discouraging criminal behaviour (Atlas, 2008). Particularly with regard to
cyber-trespassing, “crossing boundaries into other people's property and/or causing
damage” (Yar, 2005: 410), the goals of crime prevention in both domains are practically
identical.
In light of recent criminological interventions displaying the ability to reduce and
mitigate cyber-trespassing (Testa et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2015; Maimon et al., 2014,
Maimon and Louderback, 2019), the experiences of CPTED in preventing terrestrial
trespassing holds promise for providing a range of techniques for producing cybersecurity methods (Whitford, 2018). For example, Maimon and colleagues (2014) and
Stockman and colleagues (2015), tested the effect of a warning banner in an attacked
computer system on the progression, frequency, and duration of system trespassing
events and found that the warning resulted in a shorter average duration of the system

trespassing incidents (interestingly, the effect of a warning message on the duration of
repeated trespassing incidents was attenuated in computers with a large bandwidth
capacity). Wilson and associates (2015), assessed the effect of a surveillance banner on
the probability of commands being entered in the attacked computer system. They found
that the presence of a surveillance banner in the attacked computer systems reduced the
probability of commands being typed in the system during longer initial system
trespassing incidents. Finally, Maimon and and Louderback (2019) investigated whether
the level of ambiguity regarding the presence of surveillance in an attacked computer
system influences system trespassers’ likelihood to clean their tracks during the
progression of an event. Their findings indicate that the presence of unambiguous signs
of surveillance (i.e. the presence of both a surveillance banner and program in the
attacked system) increases the probability of clean tracks commands being entered on the
system.
Indeed, extensive research has revealed that prominent criminological theories
have explanatory value for cybercrime. This evidence has been especially forthcoming
when testing theories that have underlying assumptions of rational offenders including:
self control (Donner et al., 2014; Holt, Bossler, and May, 2012; Holtfreter, Reisig, and
Pratt, 2008), routine activities theory (Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016; Navarro and Jasinki,
2013; Ngo and Paternoster, 2011; Maimon et al., 2013), and restrictive deterrence (Testa
et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2015; Maimon et al., 2014). Far from suggesting that
cybercrime is discontinuous from the terrestrial world as Capeller (2001) argues, these
studies demonstrate the value of criminological theories and suggest a range of policy
alternatives that can address cybercrime beyond formal sanctioning. Employing

techniques derived from criminological approaches, scholars have revealed a growing
number of policies that hold promise for reducing system trespassing incidents, including
warning and surveillance banners, as well as surveillance software installed on an
attacked system (Testa et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2015; Maimon et al., 2014). Taken
together, there is a burgeoning evidence base that indicates that various configurations of
computing environments may result in reduction of cybercrime events within targeted
online environments. Still, only few studies have investigated the effectiveness of
CPTED strategies in influencing hackers’ online behaviours.
Present Study
In an effort to bridge this empirical gap, this study investigates the effect of four
CPTED approaches- territoriality, surveillance, place management, and access control
(Sohn, 2016; NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, 2001) on system
trespassers’ online behaviors during the progression of system trespassing event. Below
we provide a brief conceptual overview of each of the four CPTED techniques that we
are focusing on, and detail how each technique could shape the system trespassers’
initiation of those activities while working with an attacked system.
Territoriality- The concept of territoriality stems from the observation that the physical
design of a space can extend a sphere of influence over those in contact with it (Shah and
Kesan, 2007). Territorial reinforcement helps approved users to develop a sense of
proprietorship and ownership and can conversely discourages illegitimate users (Carter,
Carter, and Dannenberg, 2003). Territoriality requires creating and maintaining spatial
hierarchies, and ensuring that clear, well-recognized boundaries exist between public and
private areas (Sutton, Cherney, and White, 2008). These barriers may include hedges and

walls between public and private areas, street signs, and vegetation or changes in surface
that are used to indicate zones of transition from private to public space (Atlas, 2008).
Through clearly indicating borders in the physical environment, it is easier for residents
and other authorized people to legitimately challenge individuals who seem to be
trespassing or misusing a space and also promotes a greater perception of risk by
offenders (Crowe, 2000:37). In line with the concept of territoriality, branding, signposts,
and other reminders are routinely used online to remind legitimate and illegitimate users
of ownership and influence online behavior (van den Bos and Nell, 2006), we suspect
that notifying hackers that they had entered into a protected online environment will
instigate less activity on behalf of the trespassers during the progression of the event (i.e.
lower number of concurrent open terminals and fewer commands typed), and reduce the
likelihood of repeated system trespassing events.
Surveillance - Building upon on Jacobs’ (1961) ‘eyes on the street’ principle,
surveillance aims to increase the perceived risks associated with offending by increasing
the perception that all actions in a space will be observed (Sutton, Cherney and White,
2008:63). Through perceptually increasing the potential for intervention, apprehension,
and prosecution, rational offenders would thus be less inclined to break the law (Atlas,
2008). This may be achieved through informal means that utilize casual observation
from the people that use a space, or through formal means that exist in the form of
organized guardianship from people (civilians, security guards, and staff) and technology
(CCTV) (Sutton, Cherney and White, 2008). The positions of paths, shops, and houses
should be designed so that they can be seen by adjoining users, creating well-lit areas,
and having activity generators and facilities that increase the use of outdoor spaces

(Geason and Wilson, 1989). Echoing signs that let people know that their actions are
being observed by CCTV and being presented with monitors displaying the footage being
captured, we suspect that providing hackers with evidence for the presence of
surveillance on the attacked system will lead to less activity on behalf of the trespassers
during the progression of the event (i.e. lower number of concurrent open terminals and
fewer commands typed), and reduce the likelihood of repeated system trespassing events.
Place Management - Also known as activity, how legitimate activities within the built
environment are managed and overseen is important to establishing pride and safety
(Sutton, Cherney and White, 2008). Drawing on reasoning similar to Wilson and
Kelling’s (1982) Broken Windows Theory, the management and maintenance of the
physical environment sends cues to those who use a space (Maynard, 2004:9). Public
places that are broken down, dirty, vandalized, full of rubbish and generally ‘looking
unloved’ are less likely to encourage active legitimate use by most groups, let alone a
sense of pride and ownership by the community (Sutton, Cherney and White, 2008).
Conversely, well-maintained spaces that are well used and well supervised also send out
messages to would-be wrongdoers that the community cares (McCamley, 2001). These
messages are different from surveillance as; while the presence of CCTV or recording
one’s actions through other electronic means should reduce criminal behavior through
increasing the perceived likelihood of observation (surveillance), direct or indirect
evidence that there is ownership over the space and someone to take action would be
considered place management. Consistent with this, we suspect that presenting
trespassers with a banner indicating that the infiltrated infrastructure is cared for and
supervised by administrator, will reduce trespassers’ activity during the progression of

the event through increasing the perceived likelihood of corrective action by the owner of
the space (i.e. lower number of concurrent open terminals and fewer commands typed),
and reduce the likelihood of repeated system trespassing events.
Access Control - Access control strategies aim to encourage, restrict, and channel
activities while denying access to with those who have the potential to commit a crime
(Sutton, Cherney and White, 2008). Like surveillance, access control can involve formal,
informal or mechanical techniques to reach these goals (Sutton, Cherney and White,
2008). Informal strategies incorporate natural features that change the spatial definition
of locations (including gardens and marked entrances that signify moving from public to
private areas) (Sutton, Cherney and White, 2008). Formal access control is more
purposeful and is carried out by individuals (security guards and receptionists) or
technology (password or key controlled access points) that can prevent unauthorized
access to specific offline or online areas (Atlas, 2008). We suspect that requiring users to
provide with the login password on random occasions during their work with the system
(and after they have logged in), will reduce trespassers’ activity during the progression of
the event (i.e. lower number of concurrent open terminals and fewer commands typed),
and reduce the likelihood of repeated system trespassing events.
Table 1 below provides a brief summary of the discussion above and example of these
four CPTED concepts for ease of reference.
Table 1: CPTED Definitions and Illustrative Examples

CPTED Concept

Definition

Illustrative Examples

Territoriality

Environmental elements that
influence users, helping
proprietorship for approved users
and discouraging illegitimate or
criminal actions.

Branding, signposts, edges and walls
between public and private areas, street
signs, vegetation, and changes in
surface.

Surveillance

Environmental elements that
increase the perceived risks
associated of offending by
increasing the perception that all
actions in the environment will be
observed and/or recorded.

Either casual observation from the
people that use a space, and/or formal
forms of organized guardianship from
people (security guards and staff) and
technology (CCTV).

Place Management How legitimate activities within
an environment are managed and
overseen whereby the
management and maintenance of
the physical environment sends
cues to those using the space.

Public activity coordination, site
cleanliness, rapid repair of vandalism
and graffiti, the replacement of burned
out pedestrian and car park lighting,
and the removal or refurbishment of
decayed parts of the environment.

Access Control

Security guards and receptionists or
technology (password or key controlled
access points) that can prevent
unauthorized access to specific offline
or online areas.

Environmental elements that
encourage, restrict, and channel
activities while denying access to
with those who have the potential
to commit crime.

DATA AND METHODS
To test whether these interventions could reduce illicit online behavior, we collected
unique data that were gathered by a large set of target-computers, also known as
honeypots (Stoll, 1989; Spitzner, 2003), built for the sole purpose of being attacked, and
deployed on the computer network of a Chinese academic institute. A honeypot is a
security resource whose primary value is in being compromised by online offenders in
order to allow the collection of data on a hacker’s actions with the target of attack
(Spitzner, 2003). Honeypots provide a number of advantages for ascertain the value of
various computing configurations in influencing intruders’ behaviors. Firstly, they can be

designed to allow all potential attackers to gain access to the system, which is not
guaranteed in practice and reduces sample selection bias (Stoll 1989). Secondly, any
system trespassers can also be randomly assigned to an experimental condition, allowing
groups receiving different experimental conditions to be directly comparable in
expectation. Through removing the idiosyncratic differences between environments and
in the application of treatments, cyber environments can be tailored in honeypot
experiments to enable criminological theories to be tested (Maimon and Louderback,
2019). Indeed Farrington et al. (2002: 17) in their discussion of level 5 studies argue that
random assignment to experimental conditions deals with selection effects and provides
“the highest possible internal validity.” While Berk (2005) and Sampson (2010) note that
random experimental designs still suffer from attrition and implementation issues,
employing random assignment to experimental conditions provides the opportunity to
limit the potential influences stemming from selection effects and, importantly for
CPTED, differences in individual treatment conditions.
Although commonly used by both criminologists (Maimon et al., 2014; Wilson et
al., 2015) and computer scientists (Brown et al., 2017) to study online crimes, honeypots
do not overcome all methodological challenges, and Holt (2017) raises a number of
important considerations and limitations to these methods. While these simulated
environments are indistinguishable from normal computers for less sophisticated hackers,
fingerprinting3 techniques can be used by hackers to distinguish between regular online

3

According to Aguirre-Anaya et al. (2014: 850) fingerprinting in this context shares similar function to a
“biometric fingerprint, where a specific pattern is extracted and compared against a database, the
identification of systems is possible due to the different implementations of communication protocols,
network services or specific environments. These different features are collected and then a fingerprint is
generated, which include enough features to unequivocally identify a specific system of a set of different
systems.”

environments and honeypots (Mohammadzadeh, Mansoori, and Welch, 2013).4 In
addition, honeypots are able to measure explicit actions but are unable to measure the
fundamental attitudes, beliefs, and capabilities of intruders who interact with the
honeypot (Holt, 2017). Concordantly, while differences between experimental groups are
detectable, attributing these differences to unobserved individual-level factors is not
possible. Finally, honeypots are also unable to detect communications such as warnings
and recommendations between hackers that may alter behavior within a honeypot. As
both legal and malicious actors inform one another of weaknesses in computer hardware
and software that can be used to harm a system (Holt, 2017), the behavior exhibited
within a honeypot is not limited to be influenced only by the honeypot itself. As a result,
it can be difficult to isolate the mechanisms influencing the actions of hackers within
even a completely controlled network.
Still, the usefulness of honeypots in understanding trespassers behaviors persist
even after accounting for these limitations. Indeed, a growing body of research suggests
that restrictive deterrence and situational prevention techniques are able to influence and
in some cases reduce criminal behavior on specific networks (Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016;
Navarro and Jasinki, 2013; Ngo and Paternoster, 2011; Holt and Bossler, 2009; Testa et
al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2015; Maimon et al., 2014). Although these techniques may thus
not be able to reduce the total amount of cybercrime on their own, they can thus be used
to prevent crime in targeted places. If the goal of an intervention is total protection of a

4

Aguirre-Anaya et al. (2014) also explain several ways that low interaction honeypots could be identified.
Huang et al. (2019) also suggest that mid interaction honeypots could be identified by hackers. However,
identifying a high interaction honeypots is difficult since all of the function available in a regular computer
are available and functionable for attackers to use. Therefore, with high interaction honeypots there is less
risk of identifying the honeypots, and concordantly, high interaction honeypots were used in this study.

specific location, the ubiquity of opportunities is an asset as even the slightest
inconvenience or crime prevention initiative may be enough to demonstrate that other
online places are likely to yield results that are more beneficial for crime. While
additional challenges can increase the desire to hack these environments (Steinmetz,
2015; Holt, 2007; Taylor, 1999), other prevention techniques that do not increase hacking
challenges may still yield crime prevention promise. It is for these situations that crime
prevention through environmental design (CPTED) is specifically tailored.
Experimental Research Design
Unlike common experimental designs that require active subject recruitment, we
did not recruit subjects to participate in our experiment. Instead, we deployed our
honeypots (which hear forth will be called target computers) on the computer network of
a Chinese University between November 6th 2015 and February 24th 2016, and waited for
system trespassers to find our systems and employ special software cracking tools to break
into them. 100 Public Internet Protocol (IP) addresses were used for the deployment. To
simulate a genuine environment, the target computers had a Ubuntu-Linux based operating
system installed on, and were modified to reject the login attempts by system trespassers
on its public IP addresses until a predefined number of attempts (150 + N number) or once
a commonly used password which is commonly used by a legitimate user was entered (see
https://haveibeenpwned.com/Passwords for a list of most commonly used and pwned
passwords). Once access to our target computer had been granted, system trespassers were
randomly assigned to either the control group or one of the four experiment groups (i.e. a
1x5 factorial design). In the first experimental group, territoriality, a banner notifying the
trespasser that the device infiltrated is owned by the university was presented. In the

second experimental condition, surveillance, a banner notifying for the presence of
surveillance measures on the attacked system was presented to the system trespassers. This
banner included also the list of previous (how many) activities that were performed by the
trespasses in the system. In the third experimental group, place management, a banner
indicating that the device was cared for by an administrative person was presented to the
system trespasser. Finally, in the last experimental group, access Control, the trespasser
was requested to provide the legitimate login credentials in order to escalate privileges on
the attacked system. To allow the collection of meaningful data on system trespassing
incidents, we monitored the different components of the system trespassing incident using
specialized software that records the system trespassing events for later analysis. The
collected logs from the servers included all the commands that were entered by the hackers
on our servers, as well as the software they downloaded.
Outcome Measures
The main unit of analysis for this study is the system trespassing event. As such, all
variables and subsequent analyses are designed to examine how the behavior exhibited by
users of each IP address5 observed on the target computer during a system trespassing
event varies across the CPTED condition that they were exposed to (or the control). To
test our hypotheses we constructed three outcome measures to examine whether each
treatment was able to reduce engagement with the target computers (two measures), and
reduce the likelihood of subsequent system trespassing events (one measure). For each of
these three outcomes, if the CPTED treatments are successful then we would expect

5

An IP address is a unique numeric label (e.g. 131.87.17.67) that identifies specific devices that are
connected to a computer network and uses an Internet Protocol (IP) to communicate with other devices
(Ruiz-Sánchez, Biersack, and Dabbous, 2001).

decreases in each measure relative to the control group. Our first outcome measures the
number of concurrent Secure Shell (SSH) sessions/open terminals per unique IP address
during a system trespassing event. All in all, Linux users can control the computer they
work with as administrators remotely through a secure shall. Once connected to a
computer through SSH, the user can transfer files between the two machines and execute
commands on the remote machine. Running concurrent SSH sessions implies increased
user activities as more operations could be conducted on the remote computer
simultaneously. In line with this rationale, this measure was coded as a count variable,
with (1) indicating a single SSH session originated in a given IP address during a system
trespassing event, and higher numbers represent higher number of concurrent sessions.
Our second dependent variable is the number of commands that were entered in
the target computer during the system trespassing incident.6 This measure was coded as a
count variable, with (0) indicating that no commands were entered from a given IP
address after gaining access to the target computers. Finally, our third dependent variable
measured as a binary outcome that differentiates between unique IP addresses with more
than one recorded trespassing event (1) and IP addresses with only one recorded
trespassing incident (0).
RESULTS

6

It should be noted that a very efficient hacker will be able to obtain their goals with fewer commands.
However, to accomplish these goals, the hacker will first need to understand the system they are working
within. System configuration and the computing environment may influence the progression of the criminal
event and the volume of engagement with the system (see Wilson et al. 2015). As such, one would expect if
the treatment had its desired impact then we would see fewer commands, but if it is not effective then it
would likely lead to more in order to navigate the additional elements compared to the control group.

Over the 90-day observation period, there were 3,268 IP addresses that instigated 9,061
system trespassing incidents across the 100 target computers. Over the experimental
period, all target computers were successfully compromised and experienced a minimum
of six system trespassing events from a minimum of four unique IP addresses. Table 2
provides descriptive statistics of our sample. As can be seen in Table 2, the vast majority
of IP addresses used to access these target computers came from China (84.70%), with
the second most common country of origin being Ukraine (4.53%). Further indicating
that there was meaningful variation across the treatment conditions, the number of
sessions recorded in each condition ranged from a minimum of 1,554 (surveillance) to a
maximum of 2,192 (territorial reinforcement).
Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics

Condition
Control
Place Management
Surveillance
Territorial
Reinforcement
Access Control
Total

18
22
21

594
737
561

Open
Termin
al/ SSH
Sessions
1,802
1,807
1,554

21

766

2,192

1,215

0.87

0.04

18
100

610
3,268

1,705
9,061

941
4,829

0.84
0.85

0.05
0.05

Target
Computers

Unique IP
Addresses

Comman
ds
994
824
855

Chin
a
0.86
0.83
0.83

Ukrai
ne
0.05
0.05
0.04

Number of Concurrent SSH Sessions
The findings from this experiment indicated that all experimental conditions
experienced numerically fewer average SSH sessions per IP address compared to the
control group (F=1.97, p=0.105). As can be seen in Figure 1, the control group
experienced an average of 3.07 concurrent SSH sessions per IP address during the
observation window. While the reduction in average number of concurrent SSH sessions
was marginally statistically significant for territoriality (t=-1.407, p=0.087), it was

statistically significant for the place management (t=-4.471, p<0.001), surveillance (t=3.127, p=0.003), and access control conditions (t=-1.848, p=0.042). These findings
suggest that all four CPTED interventions have the potential to reduce the number of
concurrent SSH sessions in an online environment even after a computer has been
illegally accessed.

Figure 1: Average Number of concurrent open terminals (SSH sessions) per Unique IP Address (p<0.1 +,
p<0.05 *, P<0.01 **, p<0.001 *)

Command Usage
Across the entire sample, the number of commands that were used after gaining
access the system was 1.48, and a maximum number of 71 commands were observed for
a single IP address across 78 sessions. The highest number of commands that were used
within a single SSH session was seven, with 2,517 sessions elapsing without a single
command being entered. The control group (0.80) and the place management condition
(0.81) had the highest proportion of SSH sessions without a command, with the access
control (t= 2.748, p=0.006) and territoriality conditions (t= 2.322, p=0.02) having
statistically significant more SSH sessions with at least one command. When the average

number of commands in each experimental condition was examined, both the access
control and territoriality conditions were statistically indistinguishable from the control
group however (see Figure 2). The place management (t= -4.765, p<0.001) and
surveillance (t= -2.593, p=0.008) conditions did however yield reductions in the average
number of commands that were used compared to the control group. Taken to together
these findings suggest that despite some interventions making it more that a system
trespasser would input a command, the net impact on the number of commands was
either null (territoriality and access control) or resulted in reductions in the average
number of commands that were used.

Figure 2: Average Number of Commands entered per Unique IP Address (p<0.1 +, p<0.05 *, P<0.01 **,
p<0.001 ***)

The most frequently used command was wget, which was used 4,472 times across
the experiment. This command is used to retrieve content from a server, and was used an
average of 1.56 times per unique IP address within the control group. This average
dropped to 1.045 for the place management condition (t = -18.87, p<0.001), 1.40 for the
place management condition (t = -5.22, p<0.001), 1.47 for the place management

condition (t = -2.97, p=0.003), and 1.42 for the place management condition (t = -4.68,
p<0.001). The next most frequently used commands were ps (f=53) and kill (f=43),
which display the currently running processes and stop currently running processes
respectively. Place management was the only experimental condition that saw a reduction
in the use of the ps command, which was only used by 0.7% of unique IP addresses (t=9.52, p<0.001). Opposite to predictions however, the surveillance, territorial
reinforcement and access control groups had numerically more uses of the kill command
than the control group. However, IP addresses exposed to the place management
command did see less use of the kill command (t =-9.52, p<0.001).
Likelihood of Returning
Our last hypothesis that this study examined was whether any of the treatment
conditions made system trespassers less likely to return to the target computer. Across the
entire sample, 35.01% (f=200) of unique IPs returned to the target computer after
concluding their first SSH session in a different time. Contrary to expectation, the
territoriality and access control groups produced a numerically greater proportion of
unique IPs that returned to a target computer compared to the control group. These
differences were not found to be statistically significant using one or two-tailed
hypothesis tests however. The only statistically significant difference that was detected
was for the place management condition (t=-1.652, p=0.049). While the proportion for
the surveillance group (0.3224) was nearly identical to the place management group
(.3213), this difference coupled with the slightly smaller sample size was sufficient to
yield a statistically null difference (p=0.176).

Figure 3: Proportion of Unique IP Addresses that returned for more than one session (p<0.05 *)

DISCUSSION
CPTED offers a range of non-punitive methods for reducing crime through the
purposeful design of environments, and the findings from this study suggest that this is
not limited solely to terrestrial environments. This study sought to examine whether a
range of techniques driven by the CPTED principals from the longest continuously used
guidelines from Australia (Clancey, Fisher, and Yeung, 2016) were able to mitigate
system trespassing behavior in an experimental setting. Across all three outcomes, the
findings from this study displayed that CPTED techniques were able to alter behavior of
system trespassers in an online environment. These findings provide further credence that
the impacts of CPTED are not just limited to establishing “fortress-like structures” (see
Currie, 1993), and can be leveraged in broader and more social settings (Reynald, 2011).
Particularly as human action and crime becomes increasingly prevalent within online
environments (Chen, Baeudoin, and Hong, 2017), these findings suggest that the benefits

of this approach to crime prevention extend into online domains as well. Extending the
previous empirical literature on CPTED, these findings also demonstrate that the four
interventions examined were able to reduce offending behavior within an experimental
setting. Specifically, this addresses the issue in previous studies that were unable to
isolate the impacts of design interventions on crime from idiosyncratic environmental
factors (see Cozens and Love, 2015; Taylor, 2002). While this remains to be replicated
within a terrestrial study, this study does provide support to the evidence base that
previously observed crime prevention benefits exist regardless of idiosyncratic
differences across treatments.
Consistent with previous studies (see Testa et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2015;
Maimon et al., 2014, 2019) and boarder experiences with CPTED (Fisher and Piracha,
2012; Cozens and Love, 2015; Clancey, Fisher, and Yeung, 2016), none of the
interventions were able to stymie all illegal actions and achieve absolute prevention.
While this is unsurprising given that the interventions were only introduced after the
initial crime of system trespassing, these techniques were able to mitigate the actions of
hackers within compromised computer systems. It should be noted that the impacts were
limited and did not extend to all experimental conditions. Across all three outcomes, both
the place management and surveillance interventions performed better than territoriality
and access control conditions. Further, other indicators including the likelihood of
returning for additional system trespassing session suggested that these two conditions
had the potential to perform worse than even the control group. The only condition that
reduced the likelihood of returning was place management. Particularly as this was the
only condition that indicated active human engagement, this study highlights that future

research focus upon other CPTED interventions that rely more upon potential human
presence than upon technological presence. Particularly as all other experimental groups
either had automated processes or were passive in nature, this marks a key departure for
this CPTED technique from the others that were observed.
Despite these strengths, this study highlights the need for replication. As
discussed above, there is a need to examine different CPTED interventions. While this
study focused upon the four core techniques highlighted by the NSW Department of
Urban Affairs and Planning (2001), many additional techniques beyond these warrant
their own examination. In addition, the interventions themselves only represent one
method for designing a crime prevention strategy in line with these principles. As such,
this study highlights that other techniques may have additional value within the domains
explored in this study and beyond. In addition, as this study was unable to observe the
interpretation of these cues, it would be of great empirical benefit for subsequent studies
(especially qualitative studies) to further examine the mechanisms underlying the impacts
of these experimental conditions compared to the control group. Although this study was
conducted online and theoretically limited the impact of the physical world, as the study
was conducted at a Chinese institution and the majority of system trespassers did use a
Chinese IP address, this study highlights the need for replication in other nations to better
evaluate the generalizability of these findings. Finally, as this study was limited an
observation period of 30 days, this study highlights the need for future studies to examine
whether the impacts observed here persist over time, spread, or potentially decay (see
Sherman, 1990; Nagin, 1998; Sorg et al., 2017).

Taking these limitations into consideration, we hope that our findings may
support existing contemporary cybersecurity efforts which are aimed at mitigating
attackers’ actions while exploiting vulnerabilities and working with an attacked platform
in a more efficient way. Acknowledging the potential risks posed by cyber-dependent
crimes to governments, businesses, and individual Internet users, cyber security experts
have devoted considerable attention to developing tools and policies that are designed to
prevent system trespassing from developing (Waldrop 2016). Unfortunately, only
negligent number of tools support effective mitigation of the consequence of an attack.
One major reason for the deficiency of these tools in accomplishing these goals is their
failure to integrate knowledge about online attackers’ behaviors in response to different
configuration of the attacked computer system during the progression of the system
trespassing event. This study brings context embedded experimental evidence regarding
computing environments that entice attackers to behave in a predictable manner, which in
turn, may result in less severe consequences to the attacked system.
Conclusions
Findings from this study demonstrate that specific CPTED strategies can prevent
crime after removing the influence of idiosyncratic differences. These findings thus not
only provide evidence for the value of this crime prevention perspective, but also
demonstrate that it has value beyond the physical built environment. In addition, the
techniques used in this experiment provide an easily implement means for minimizing
illegal online behavior by reducing the number of hacking sessions, the number of
commands typed in the attacked computer, and the likelihood of hackers returning to a
previously hacked environment.
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